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Abstract
We study two-sided markets with a nite numbers of agents on each
side, and with two-sided incomplete information. Agents are matched
assortatively on the basis of costly signals. A main goal is to identify
conditions under which the potential increase in expected output due to
assortative matching (relative to random matching) is completely o¤set
by the costs of signalling. We also study how the signalling activity and
welfare on each side of the market change when we vary the number of
agents and the distribution of their attributes, thereby displaying e¤ects
that are particular to small markets. Finally, we look at the continuous
version of our two-sided market model and establish the connections to
the nite version. Technically, the paper is based on the very elegant the-
ory about stochastic ordering of (normalized) spacings and other linear
combinations of order statistics from distributions with monotone fail-
ure rates, pioneered by R. Barlow and F. Proschan (1966, 1975) in the
framework of reliability theory.
We wish to thank Ilan Eshel, Georg Nöldeke, Avner Shaked, Moshe Shaked, Xianwen
Shi, Lones Smith, and Asher Wolinsky for helpful remarks, and Thomas Tröger for discussing
the paper during a seminar at the University of Bonn. This research has been partially
nanced by the Max Planck Research Prize (Moldovanu), and by the German Science Foun-
dation through SFB 15-TR (Hoppe, Moldovanu, Sela). Hoppe, Moldovanu: Department of
Economics University of Bonn; Sela: Department of Economics, Ben Gurion University
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1 Introduction
We examine two-sided markets where a nite number of privately informed
agents on each side of the market compete for potential matching partners
on the other side. Examples include marriage markets, labor and education
markets, markets for venture capital and new technologies. In these markets,
agents typically di¤er in their attributes, and they gain from being matched
with a better partner. If the matching surplus function is supermodular, as we
assume here, total surplus is maximized by matching the agents assortatively.
But assortative matching cannot work (at least not directly) if types are private
information - here signalling can fulll a crucial role. By revealing private
information about types, signalling can determine who is to be matched with
whom, thus increasing aggregate output. One of our main goals is to identify
conditions under which the potential increase in output is completely o¤set by
the costs of signalling.
The paper combines three main features:
1. We consider a nite number of agents on both sides of the market. More
precisely, we multiplytwo tournament models with several agents and
several prizes (as developed by Moldovanu and Sela 2001, 2005) by letting
the agents on one side represent the prizes for which the agents on the
other side compete. Thus, both sides are active here and the signalling
behavior of each agent is a¤ected by features (such as number of agents
and distribution of characteristics) of both sides of the market.
2. We allow for incomplete information on both sides. Since there is a nite
number of agents, no agent knows here for sure his/her rank in its own
population, nor the quality of a prospective equilibrium partner. This
should be contrasted with the situation in models with a continuum of
agents, or with complete information, where knowledge of own attribute
and of the distributions of attributes on both sides of the market com-
pletely determines own and equilibrium-partner rank, and thus the value
of the equilibrium match. In our model these values are interdependent,
and agents need to form expectations about the attributes of other agents
on both sides of the market.
3. We introduce a new mathematical methodology to the study of two-sided
markets with a nite number of agents. This is based on the elegant work
on stochastic orders among normalized spacings (e.g., di¤erences) and
other linear combinations of order statistics, pioneered by Richard Barlow
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and Frank Proschan (1965, 1966, 1975) in the framework of reliability
theory.1 Roughly speaking, Barlow and Proschan show how the behavior
of linear combinations of order statistics is controlled by monotonicity
properties of the failure rates of underlying distributions. As mentioned
above, our agents form expectations about the others attributes, and
their strategic behavior is determined by properties of the marginal gains
from getting (stochastically) better partners. We can apply Barlow and
Proschans theory precisely because these marginal gains are represented
here by spacings of order statistics, and because aggregate signalling and
net welfare on each side of the market are linear combinations of so called
normalized spacings.2
The paper is organized as follows:
In Section 2, we describe the matching model and introduce some useful
denitions.
In Section 3 we derive a side-symmetric signalling equilibrium in strictly
monotonic strategies. In this equilibrium, assortative matching based on the
ranking of signals is equivalent (in terms of output) to assortative matching
based on the ranking of true attributes.
The e¤ects of increasing the number of agents (i.e., entry) in two-sided mar-
kets are analyzed in Section 4.3 Entry a¤ects the expected matching surplus,
but also the agentssignalling activity. We show that the e¤ects of entry (e.g.,
net e¤ect on welfare on each side of the market) are determined by the failure
rates of the underlying distributions of characteristics. In particular, we illus-
trate a situation where an additional woman reduces both mens and womens
per capita welfare. The entry results are also methodologically useful since some
of our subsequent proofs proceed by considering a market with equal numbers
of agents on each side to which we add agents in order to create a long side.
In Section 5 we study the e¤ects (on both sides of the market) of changes in
the distribution of attributes on one side. In Subsection 5.1 we rst study the
e¤ects of increased heterogeneity on output, signalling, and welfare. While it is
intuitive that more heterogeneity increases output in assortative matching, we
show that the e¤ect on signalling activity and welfare may be ambiguous (and
1For basic texts on order statistics and stochastic orders, see David and Nagaraja, (2003),
and Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994), respectively. Boland et al. (2002) is a good survey of
the material most relevant for the present study.
2These are appropriately scaled spacings (see below).
3Our comparative statics results in this and the next section focus on aggregate measures
of signalling and welfare. We briey point out the implications for individual measures - these
are governed by the same properties of failure rates.
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that it depends, again, on failure rates). In Subsection 5.2 we examine the
related conditions under which one side of the market necessarily incurs higher
signalling costs than the other. In Subsection 5.3 we increase the distribution
of one side of the market (say men) in the hazard rate order (which implies rst
order stochastic dominance). The e¤ects on total output, mens total signalling,
and womens total welfare, respectively are unambiguous: these always increase.
Quite interestingly, womens total signalling and mens total welfare necessarily
increase only under additional conditions on failure rates.
In Section 6 we compare random matching (without any signalling) with
assortative matching based on costly and wasteful signalling. For distribution
functions having a decreasing failure rate average (DFRA), assortative matching
with signalling turns out to be welfare-superior, while for distribution functions
having an increasing failure rate average (IFRA), random matching is superior.
In the latter case, we also show that agents may be trapped: given that all
others engage in signalling, signalling is individually optimal, even though each
type of each agent may be better o¤ under random matching.
In Section 7 we look at the continuous version of our market model. Direct
arguments in the continuous model can be used to yield similar results to the
discrete version, but under weaker conditions. Instead of failure rates, these
conditions involve now the coe¢ cient of (co)variation of the distributions of
types. A main insight is that total signalling e¤ort in the continuous model
equals exactly half of total output. We use this result to show that, in sym-
metric settings, assortative matching with signalling is welfare-superior (welfare
inferior) to random matching if the coe¢ cient of variation is larger (smaller)
than unity. We also show that the discrete model analyzed in the previous sec-
tions converges to the continuous version by letting the number of agents go to
innity. In particular, some phenomena displayed in the nite version may dis-
appear in large populations, calling for some caution when making arguments
(e.g., about welfare e¤ects) in small markets.
Section 8 concludes. Appendix A contains several useful results from the
statistical literature, while Appendix B contains all the proofs of our results.
Finally, we want to note here that many of our results have immediate im-
plications for models with incomplete information on one side, or with complete
information, as have been often used in the literature reviewed below. We give
some examples in the text.
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1.1 Related literature
The general insight that agents may choose costly signals to reveal private in-
formation is of course well-known: Spence (1973) has prominently shown how
investment in education may serve as a signal to prospective employers even
if the content of the education is itself negligible. A related idea appears in
evolutionary biology where animals signal their tness, i.e., their propensity to
survive and reproduce, to potential mating partners. According to the handicap
principle, put forward by Zahavi (1975), signals must be disadvantageous in
order to be honest. The peacocks tail is a classical example.4 The handicap
principle is widely used to relate the evolution of some animal and human traits
to sexual selection, i.e., the competition for mates,5 but we are not aware of a
full-edged signalling-cum matching model in the biological literature (see the
survey in Maynard-Smith and Harper, 2003).
The study of two-sided matching based on individual, ordinal preferences was
pioneered by Gale and Shapley (1962). The assignment model with transferable
utility is due to Shapley and Shubik (1972), who focus on properties of the core.6
Kelso and Crawford (1982), Mo (1988), and Crawford (1991) derive compar-
ative statics results about changes in core payo¤s following entry on one side
of various two-sided market games, including the assignment game. A main
insight is that entry on one side lowers the payo¤s of same-side agents already
in the market, while increasing the payo¤ of all agents on the other side. We
refer to, and contrast this insight in Section 4.
Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1999) formalize the meaning of perfect compe-
tition in the assignment game with either a nite number or a continuum of
agents. Perfect competition (where agents appropriate their marginal products,
and where the core is a singleton) is typical for the continuum version, but rare
for the nite version. The leeway between perfect competition in the contin-
uum version versus less than perfect competition in the nite version plays an
important role in our study.
In a classic study, Becker (1973) focuses on populations vertically di¤er-
entiated by a unique, linearly ordered attribute, and stressed the implications
of assortative matching.7 In Beckers framework (with a continuum of types
4Charles Darwin once remarked: The sight of a peacock tail, whenever I gaze at it, makes
me sick.
5See Zahavi and Zahavi, 1997, and Miller, 2001.
6An early economic model of an assignment market is Koopmans and Beckmann (1957).
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) o¤er an excellent survey of the literature following Gale and
Shapleys contribution. For a more recent survey of the literature on networks and two-sided
markets, see Spulber (2005).
7All "classical" contributions focus on centralized matching schemes. In the framework of
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and complete information), McAfee (2002) shows that, for a certain subset of
distributions of characteristics,8 a coarse matching involving only two distinct
classes achieves at least as much output as the average of assortative match-
ing and random matching. In the same model, Costrell and Loury (2004) and
Suen (2005) study how the core payo¤ of the agents on one side of the market
changes when one changes the distribution of attributes of agents on the other
side.9 Our analysis in Section 5 is, roughly speaking, similarly motivated, but
the focus here is on aggregate levels of output, signalling, and welfare in markets
with a nite number of agents, and incomplete information on both sides. We
emphasize some of the new insights appearing in our setting.
Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992) rst analyzed an important variety
of models (called matching tournaments by Hopkins, 2005) where agents get
matched on the basis of some ex-ante costly actions (as the signals in our paper).
We review below several relevant papers on matching tournaments - none of
them contains a model with two active sides, incomplete information on both
sides, and nite numbers of agents.
Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001a,b) study complete information models
with a continuum of agents and a nite number of agents, respectively, and with
identical distributions of attributes. Agents can increase the value of a match
by making costly investments, and the focus is on the possibility of achieving
e¢ cient ex-ante investments levels (thus overcoming the hold-up problem)10 .
Peters (2004) studies the limit, as the number of agents goes to innity, of
mixed strategy equilibria arising in a complete-information model where a nite
number of agents on each side of the market make costly investments prior to
the match. The limit need not correspond to the hedonic equilibrium in the
market with a continuum of agents.
Bulow and Levin (2005) look at the mixed-strategy equilibrium in a complete
information model with a nite number of workers and rms. Only rms are
active, and they make salary o¤ers to workers, while workers choose rms in
terms of their o¤ers. The main results compare the resulting outcome with the
competitive equilibrium in that market.
Beckers model, Shimer and Smith (2000) derive conditions under which a decentralized search
equilibrium leads to assortative matching. Anderson and Smith (2004) show how assortative
matching may fail in a dynamic search model with unobserved types.
8This is a subset of the class of distributions with increasing failure rates.
9See also Sattingers (1993) survey on theories of the distribution of earnings based on
assignment models.
10Felli and Roberts (2002) use an explicit model of competition for partners (Bertrand) in
order to dispense with a strong assumption used by Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite in the nite
case.
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All models mentioned so far had complete information about attributes. Let
us now review several models that allow for incomplete information on only one,
active side.
Chao and Wilson (1987) and Wilson (1989) consider a seller facing a contin-
uum of customers who di¤er in their valuations for service quality. Valuations
are private information. They show how customers can be assortatively matched
to service qualities by o¤ering them price menus that induce them to reveal their
type. They also derive asymptotic results about the relative e¢ ciency loss of
o¤ering coarser quality classes.
Fernandez and Gali (1999) compare markets to matching tournaments in a
model with a continuum of agents on each side. Again, only one side is active.
The main result is that, in spite of the wasteful signalling, tournaments may be
welfare superior to markets if the active agents have budget constraints.
Hopkins and Kornienko (2005) and Hopkins (2005) consider several versions
of a labor markets with a continuum of workers and rms who di¤er in their
quality levels. Only one side is active: while the quality of rms is observable,
workers must exert an e¤ort in order to signal their quality to rms. Their
main results distinguish the e¤ects on individual equilibrium behavior of workers
caused by changes in the distribution of workersattributes from those caused
by changing the distribution of rmsattributes.
In Nöldeke and Samuelsons (2003) biologically inspired model, several pri-
vately informed males compete for the attention of a unique female by sending
costly signals. This is similar to an all-pay one-object auction, but the twist
is that the chosen males tness (and hence his ultimate attractiveness for the
female) is reduced by the amount of the signal -this would correspond here to
a corresponding decrease in the feasible output of a matched pair. The authors
identify situations in which a signalling equilibrium may not exist.
Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2005) study all-pay auctions with a nite number
of privately informed bidders, and with a nite number of di¤erent prizes. Bids
are submitted and ranked, and then prizes are awarded accordingly (highest
prize to highest bidder, etc...). The focus is on the revenue e¤ects of changes
in the number and size of the various prizes, in the bidding costs, and in the
tournaments structure (e.g., one-stage or two-stage competition over prizes). As
mentioned above, our present model is the extension of their analysis whereby
prizes come to life.
Kittsteiner and Moldovanu (2005) study an all-pay auction model where
privately informed, randomly arriving (Poisson) customers bid for positions in
a queue. In their model the value of a customer-position match depends also
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on attributes (e.g., processing times) of other customers. Both assortative and
anti-assortative matching can occur in equilibrium, depending on the shape of
the function measuring the cost of delay.
Damiano and Li (2004) allow for two-sided incomplete information in a
model with a continuum of types on each side, extending the type of analy-
sis performed on one side by Chao and Wilson (1987) and Wilson (1989) - we
show here how this model arises as the limit of our model with nite numbers
of agents on each side (see Section 7). Damiano and Li nd conditions under
which a revenue-maximizing match-maker nds it optimal to choose assortative
matching rather than coarser schemes.
Hoppe, Moldovanu and Ozdenoren (2005) assess an intermediarys revenue
loss from coarse matching à la McAfee (2002), and study the e¤ects on revenue
of various contractual agreements among matched partners.
The above two papers consider models with two-sided incomplete informa-
tion. In this context it is also worth mentioning the relations to the literature
on double auctions - see Perry and Reny (2005) for a recent model with in-
terdependent values, and for a good survey of this strand of the literature. In
contrast to the standard case in the double auction literature, our signals (that
can be interpreted as bids) only determine who trades with whom, but not the
terms of trade. On the other hand, in Perry and Renys model (and in most
of the literature) all traded units are identical (so that the optimal matching
problem is fairly simple), while here they are heterogenous.
2 The matching model
There is a nite set N = f1; 2; :::; ng of men, and a nite set K = f1; 2; :::; kg of
women, where n  k: Each man is characterized by an attribute x; each woman
by an attribute y: If a man and a woman are matched, the utility of each is the
product of their attributes. Thus, total output from a match between agents
with types x and y is 2xy:
Agents i attribute is private information to i: Attributes are independently
distributed over the interval [0; F ]; [0; G]; F; G  1; according to distribu-
tions F (men) and G (women), respectively. For all distributions mentioned in
the paper we assume (without mentioning it again) that F (0) = G(0) = 0; that
F and G have continuous densities, f > 0 and g > 0; respectively, and nite
rst and second moments - in particular, this last requirement will ensure that
all integrals used below are well dened (e.g., all order statistics have nite
expectations).
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We study the following matching tournament: Each agent sends a costly
signal b; and signals are submitted simultaneously. Agents on each side are
ranked according to their signals, and are then matched assortatively. That is,
the man with the highest signal is matched with the woman with the highest
signal, the man with the second-highest signal is matched with woman with
the second-highest signal, and so forth. Agents with same signals are randomly
matched to the corresponding partners. The utility of a man with attribute x
that is matched to a woman with attribute y after sending a signal b is given by
xy   b (and similarly for women). Thus, signals are costly. For the subsequent
welfare comparisons we assume that signalling e¤orts are wasted from the point
of view of our men and women11 . In other variations, not explicitly considered
here, these may accrue as rents to a third party. The equilibrium analysis is
invariant to such alternative specications.
Note that all our results can be extended to asymmetric production functions
having the form (x)(y) , where  and  are strictly increasing and di¤erentiable
(see Section 5.1 for an example with a Cobb-Douglas production function)
2.1 Order statistics and failure rates
Let X(1;n)  X(2;n)      X(n;n) and Y(1;k)  Y(2;k)      Y(k;k); denote
the order statistics of men and women, respectively. We dene X(0;n)  0
(Y(0;k)  0).
Let F(i;n) (G(i;k)) denote the distribution of X(i;n) (Y(i;k)). The density of
X(i;n) is given by :
f(i;n) (x) =
n!
(i  1)! (n  i)!F (x)
i 1
[1  F (x)]n i f (x) ;
and similarly for Y(i;k):
Let Fni (s) be the probability that a man with type s meets n 1 competitors
such that i 1 have a lower type and n  i have a higher type. For i = 2; :::n 1;
we obtain:
Fni (s) = F(i 1;n 1) (s)  F(i;n 1) (s) =
(n  1)!
(i  1)! (n  i)!F (s)
i 1
[1  F (s)]n i ;
We let Fnn (s) = F(n 1;n 1) (s) ; and F
n
1 (s) = 1  F(1;n 1) (s) :
Similarly, we denote by Gki (s) the probability that a woman with type s
meets k   1 competitors such that i   1 have a lower type and k   i have a
higher type.
11That is, apart from their function enabling matching.
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Let EX (EY ) be the expectation of F (G): We denote by EX(i;n) (EY(i;k))
the expected value of the order statistic X(i;n) (Y(i;k)), and dene EX(0;n) =
EY(0;k) = 0: A useful identity, repeatedly used below, is :
nX
i=1
EX(i;n) = nEX
Denition 1 Let H be a distribution on [0; H ] with density f .
1. The failure rate12 of H is given by the function  (x)  f (x) = [1 H (x)] ;
x 2 [0; H):
2. H is said to have an increasing (decreasing) failure rate (IFR) (DFR) if
 (x) is increasing (decreasing) in x.13
3. H is said to have an increasing (decreasing) failure rate on average (IFRA)
(DFRA) if (
R x
0
 (t) dt)=x is increasing (decreasing) in x.
The exponential distribution has a constant failure rate, and it is the only
distribution that is both IFR and DFR. Clearly, the family of IFRA (DFRA)
distributions includes all IFR (DFR) distributions.
3 Equilibrium analysis
We focus below on a symmetric equilibrium where all agents on one side of
the market use the same strategy. Assume then that all men (women) use the
same, strictly monotonic and di¤erentiable equilibrium signalling function  ().
Then, the maximization problem of a man with type x is
maxs
Pn
i=n k+1 xF
n
i (s)EY(k (n i);k)    (s)
	
The rst order condition is
0 (s) =
n 1X
i=n k+1
s

f(i 1;n 1) (s)  f(i;n 1) (s)

EY(k (n i);k)
+f(n 1;n 1) (s) sEY(k;k)
12Some authors use the term "hazard rate".We keep here the terminology used by Barlow
and Proschan.
13 IFR distributions are also called logconcave. Examples are the exponential, uniform,
normal, power (for   1), Weibull (for   1); gamma (for   1). DFR distributions are
also called logconvex. Examples are the exponential, Weibull (for 0 <   1); gamma (for
0 <   1): See Barlow and Proschan (1975).
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The man with the lowest type either never wins a woman (if n > k) or wins
for sure the woman with the lowest type (if n = k). Hence, the optimal signal
of this type is always zero, which yields the boundary condition  (0) = 0: The
solution of the di¤erential equation gives candidate equilibrium e¤ort functions.
Proposition 1 The prole of strategies where each man employs the strictly
increasing signalling function
 (x) =
Z x
0
s
(
n 1X
i=n k+1

f(i 1;n 1) (s)  f(i;n 1) (s)

EY(k n+i;k)
)
ds
+
Z x
0
sf(n 1;n 1) (s)EY(k;k)ds (1)
and each woman employs the analogously derived signalling function  (y) con-
stitutes an equilibrium of the matching contest.
The next proposition reveals that the aggregate signalling e¤ort (say womens)
is a weighted sum of expectations of normalized spacings of order statistics on
the mens side, (n   i + 1)(X(i;n)  X(i 1;n)), where the weights EY(i (n k);k)
are expectations of the womens order statistics (and vice-versa for men). The
weights are increasing in i:
The same observation holds for the net welfare terms of each side (note that
the expression for the mens total welfare, (3), is similar to that of womens total
signalling, while womens total welfare, (5), is similar to mens total signalling).
Here we introduce the assumption of wasteful signalling.
Proposition 2 For any F;G; n; k; it holds that:
1. Mens total signalling e¤ort and (net) welfare are given by :
Sm (n; k) = n
Z F
0
 (x) f (x) dx
=
nX
i=n k+1
(n  i+ 1)  EY(k n+i;k)   EY(k n+i 1;k)EX(i 1;n);
(2)
Wm(n; k) =
nX
i=n k+1
EX(i;n)EY(k (n i);k)   Sm (n; k)
=
nX
i=n k+1
(n  i+ 1)  EX(i;n)   EX(i 1;n)EY(i (n k);k) (3)
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2. Womens total signalling e¤ort and (net) welfare are given by :
Sw (n; k) = k
Z G
0
 (y) g (x) dx
=
nX
i=n k+1
(n  i+ 1)  EX(i;n)   EX(i 1;n)EY(k n+i 1;k)
(4)
Ww(n; k) =
nX
i=n k+1
EX(i;n)EY(k (n i);k)   Sw (n; k)
=
nX
i=n k+1
(n  i+ 1)  EY(i (n k);k)   EY(i (n k) 1;k)EX(i;n)
(5)
3. Total expected (net) welfare in assortative matching based on costly sig-
nalling is at least half the expected output (or, in other words, aggregate
signalling e¤orts are less than half output).
W (n; k) = 2
nX
i=n k+1
EX(i;n)EY(k (n i);k)   Sm(n; k)  Sw(n; k)(6)

nX
i=n k+1
EX(i;n)EY(k (n i);k) (7)
The spacings of order statistics (X(i;n)   X(i 1;n)) represent the marginal
gains from winning a stochastically better partner. For the exponential distrib-
ution H; it is well-known that the normalized spacings
(n  i+ 1) (Z(i;n) Z(i 1;n)) are i.i.d. for i = 1; 2; ::n: Thus, it is to be expected
that certain transformations of the exponential lead to some monotonicity prop-
erties of the spacings. Indeed, Barlow and Proschan (1966) have shown:
Theorem 1 If F is IFR (DFR), then the corresponding normalized spacings
(n  i+ 1)  X(i;n)  X(i 1;n) are stochastically decreasing (increasing) in i =
1; 2; :::; n for xed n , and stochastically increasing (decreasing) in n  i; for
xed i:
Thus, if the normalized spacings are increasing in i (as is the case for DFR
distributions), both total signalling e¤ort and total welfare will be relatively
high (we have assortative matchingbetween weights and normalized spacings
in the above expressions). The opposite holds for IFR distributions, since then
the normalized spacings are decreasing in i:
In the following sections, we will obtain several kinds of comparative static
results with respect to aggregate measures - as we will see, some of the e¤ects
12
are particular to relatively small markets and cannot occur in large populations
(see Section 7). The di¤erence stems from the fact that, in the model with a
continuum of agents arising as the limit of the present one, total signalling is
very tightly related to output (in ratio of one half), while here there is a leeway
among output and signalling (caused by the strictly positive spacings) that may
get larger or smaller in various circumstances.
4 The e¤ects of entry
We now analyze the e¤ects of changes in the number of agents on each side.
Additional agents unambiguously increase the expected matching output.
If there is entry on the long side (i.e. entry by men), the number of matches
remains unchanged, but the expected value of the ith man is increased. If there
is entry on the short side (i.e. entry by women), both the number of matches
and the expected value of the ith woman gets higher. On the other hand, entry
also a¤ects the agentssignalling activity. The next propositions show how the
net e¤ect on welfare depends on certain properties of the distribution of agents
types.
Proposition 3 Suppose there is entry on the mens side. Then, for all G,
1. mens total signalling increases for all F;
2. womens total signalling increases (decreases) if F is DFR (IFR);
3. mens total welfare increases (decreases) if F is DFR (IFR);
4. womens total welfare increases for all F:
Entry on the mens side leads to sti¤er competition among men. While the
e¤ort of low types gets smaller (these types are "discouraged"), the e¤ort of
high types gets larger, leading to an increase in total signalling. In contrast,
the e¤ect on womens signalling e¤ort depends on whether the distribution of
mens type F has an increasing or a decreasing failure rate. By Theorem 1,
if F is DFR (IFR), (n  i+ 1)  X(i;n)  X(i 1;n) is stochastically increasing
(decreasing) in i; for xed n. This implies that the marginal gains from winning
a better man are relatively high (small) with respect to highly-ranked men
if F is DFR (IFR). Moreover, by Theorem 8 (Appendix A), if F is DFR
(IFR), the di¤erence of successive order statistics is stochastically increasing
(decreasing) jointly in i and n. This implies that, for DFR (IFR), entry by men
even further increases (reduces) the relatively high (small) marginal gains from
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winning a better man with respect to highly-ranked men. As a consequence,
total signalling by women goes up if F is DFR, while the opposite holds if F is
IFR.
Note that total output is always increasing in the number of men. It can be
shown that this increase is larger if F is DFR than if F is IFR. On the womens
side, we nd that this output e¤ect outweighs the increase in total signalling if
F is DFR. Moreover, if F is IFR, womens total signalling goes down. Hence,
womens total welfare is always increasing in the number of men.
On the mens side, if F is DFR, the output e¤ect outweighs the increase
in mens signalling, similarly as for women. However, in contrast to womens
total signalling, mens total signalling gets also higher if F is IFR. In fact, we
nd that in this case the signalling e¤ect outweighs the output e¤ect, leading
to a reduction in mens total welfare. Combining these observations, we can
conclude that total welfare is increased if F is DFR, but may be reduced if F
is IFR. Such a welfare loss due to entry is illustrated in the following example.
Example 1 Suppose F = x10; G = x; and  = 1: Fix k = 3: Then, as depicted
by the graph below, W (3; 3) ' 2: 0779; W (4; 3) ' 1: 5202; W (5; 3) ' 1: 4994,
W (6; 3) ' 1: 4944; W (7; 3) ' 1: 4929; W (8; 3) ' 1: 4926; for n > 8 entry on
the mens side is welfare increasing, and limn!1W (n; 3) = 1: 5:
6 8 10 12 14
1.493
1.494
1.495
1.496
1.497
1.498
1.499
n
W
The next proposition analyzes the e¤ects of entry on the womens side.
Proposition 4 Suppose there is entry on the womens side. Then, for all F ,
1. mens total signalling increases if G is DFR,
2. womens total signalling increases for all G,
3. mens total welfare increases for all G,
4. womens total welfare increases if G is DFR.
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Entry by women has similar e¤ects to entry by men, except that it leads
to a higher number of matches, and hence a higher number of prizes for men.
This increase has, ceteris paribus, a positive e¤ect on the mens total signalling
e¤ort. Therefore, even if the distribution of womens types G is IFR, mens
total signalling may increase due to the presence of additional women.
It is interesting to note that, while mens total welfare always increases in
the number of women, mens per capita welfare, Wm (n; k) =n; may actually
decrease, due to increased signalling. In the following example, we illustrate
a situation where additional women may reduce both mens and womens per
capita welfare. This nding should be compared to the existing results on entry
mentioned in the introduction: Focussing on extremal core payo¤s14 in the
complete information assignment game, it is known that adding an agent to one
side of the market always makes all other agents on the same side (on the other
side) weakly worse-o¤ (better-o¤).
Example 2 Suppose F = x; G = y; and  = 1: Fix n = 20: Then mens total
per capita welfare is given by Wm (n; k) =n = k (31  k) =1260; and Wm (n; k) =n
is increasing in k for k  15; and decreasing for 15 < k  20:
5 10 15 20
0.0
0.1
0.2
k
Wm/n
Womens total per capita welfare is given by Ww(n; k)=k = (31  k) =63; which
is decreasing for all k  20:
5 10 15 20
0.0
0.2
0.4
k
Ww/k
14For large populations we relate the signalling e¤orts and net welfare in our model to the
stable (i.e., core) payo¤s; see the proof of Proposition 9 in the Appendix.
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5 The e¤ects of changes in the distributions of
attributes
In this section we study how output, signalling, and welfare on both sides of the
market are a¤ected by changes in the distribution of agentsattributes on one
side of the market. We also compare the signalling activity and welfare of men
and women in a given, xed setting.
5.1 The e¤ects of increases in heterogeneity
Denition 2 1. A function  is star-shaped on [0; ) if (x)=x is increasing
in x.
2. Let X(Z) have distributions F (H) such that F (0) = H(0) = 0: Distri-
bution F is star-shaped with respect to H if the function H 1F (x) is
star-shaped (that is, H 1F (x)=x is increasing for x  0) .
3. Distribution F is convex with respect to H if the function H 1F (x) is
convex on the support of F:
Consider two distributions F and H such that F (0) = H(0) = 0: Since
convex functions  on [0; ) such that (0)  0 are star-shaped, we obtain that
H 1F (x) is convex implies H 1F (x) is star-shaped. If H is the exponential
distribution then H 1F (x) is convex (concave) is equivalent to F being IFR
(DFR), and H 1F (x) (F 1H(x)) star-shaped is equivalent to F being IFRA
(DFRA).
A crucial property is single crossing : IfH 1F (x) is star-shaped then 1 F (x)
crosses 1  H(x) at most once, and then from above, as x increases from 0 to
1: In particular, if F and H have the same mean, then a crossing must occur,
and F has a smaller variance than H:
In the Appendix A we detail the consequences of single-crossing on order
statistics - these are the mathematical results used in this part. We can now
state:
Proposition 5 Let H;F be two distributions of the mens attributes with the
same expectation, and assume that H 1F (x) is star-shaped : Let G be the dis-
tribution of womens attributes. Then the following hold:
1. For any n  k, and for any G, total output in assortative matching under
F is smaller than total output under H:
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2. For n = k; and for G IFR, mens total signalling under F is higher than
under H:
3. For any n  k; and for any G, womens total signalling under F is lower
than under H.
4. For any n  k; and for any G, mens total welfare in the signalling equi-
librium under F is smaller than mens total welfare under H:
5. For n = k; and for G IFR (DFR), womens total welfare under F is
higher (lower) than under H: For any n  k and for G DFR, womens
total welfare under F is lower than under H:
It is interesting to observe that increased heterogeneity on one side of the
market (say men) always leads to higher expected output and to higher total
welfare on the same side of market (point 1,4 above),15 while this is not neces-
sarily true for the other side (point 5). The reason is as follows: While expected
output increases, total women signalling also increases (point 3).16 But the in-
crease in output is relatively large if the womens distribution G is DFR, thus
o¤setting the increase in womens signalling, while the increase in output is
relatively small if G is IFR, in which case womens welfare may go down.
In Beckers classical setting with complete information and a continuum of
agents, Suens (2005) main result is that increasing heterogeneity (in a sense
that is weaker than ours) on mens side lowers total welfare of women if the
distribution of womens attributes is IFR. Point 5 of our last result clearly
shows that the opposite occurs if the distribution of womens attributes is DFR.
5.2 Mens versus womens signalling
In many applications (e.g., biological studies of sexual selection, development
studies about marriage markets in rural societies17) it is of interest to compare
the signalling activity on both sides of the market. The next result is also
15Men with high types face less intensive competition under H: If G is IFR, the marginal
gains from winning a better woman are small for these men. This reduces the signalling e¤orts
for high types, and vice versa for low types.
16Both the expected quality of high-ranked men and the di¤erences between high-ranked
men and low-ranked men are higher under H. Under H, the e¤ort of high-type women is
larger than that under F; and the the e¤ort of low-type women is smaller.
17Consider, for example, an insightful excerpt taken from the empirical study of marriage
in rural Ethiopia due Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2005): "if the di¤erence between grooms is
large relative to the di¤erence between brides, brides must bring more to fend o¤ competition
from lower ranked brides who wish to improve their ranking"
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relevant for the study of intermediated markets where payments from agents
accrue to a third party.
Proposition 6 1. Let n = k and let G 1F be star-shaped: Then mens sig-
nalling e¤ort is higher than womens. Thus, if signals are wasteful, women
are better-o¤ than men.
2. Let either F or G be IFR, and let G 1F be convex. Then, for any n  k;
mens signalling e¤ort is higher than womens
The above conditions involve the function G 1F . This function has an
important meaning here: it describes the assortative matching function in the
continuous version of our model (see Section 7).
A simple and more intuitive corollary is as follows:
Corollary 1 Let F be convex and G be concave. Then, for any n  k; mens
total signalling e¤ort is higher than womens.
If F has an increasing density while G has a decreasing density, then men
with relatively high types face a sti¤er competition than those with relatively
low types, while the opposite holds for women. In addition, if F is convex and G
concave, the di¤erences in successive order statistics is decreasing on the mens
side, and increasing on the womens side (see Boland et al., 2001). This implies
that the marginal gains in terms of winning a better matching partner are larger
with respect to highly-ranked men than highly-ranked women, which tends to
further increase total mens e¤ort relative to womens.
Remark 1 We have mentioned in Section 2 that our results can be easily ex-
tended to models with a production function of the form 2(x)(y) where  and
 are strictly increasing, non-negative functions. Here is an example derived
from the above observations: consider the Cobb-Douglas production 2(x)(y)
= 2xcyd; c; d > 0: Let n = k; and assume that mens and womens attributes
are uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. This model is equivalent to the one where
the types are ex; ey; the production function is 2exey , and the distributions of at-
tributes are eF (ex) = ex1=c; eG(ey) = ey1=d: Thus, men signal more and are worse-o¤
if c  d:
5.3 The e¤ects of increases in quality
We now assume that the distribution of mens attributes F (random variable
X) changes to another distribution H (random variable Z); such that X hr Z:
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In particular, EX  EZ; and EX(i;n)  EZ(i;n) , i = 1; 2; :::n: Thus, there is
an unambiguous increase in the quality of men. The e¤ects on expected output
, mens total signalling, and womens total welfare are also unambiguous: all
these measures are higher under H than under F because women receive better
prizes and because competition among men is stronger.18 The e¤ect on mens
total welfare and women total signalling are more subtle.19
Proposition 7 Let X;Z two random variables with distributions F and H;
respectively, such that X hr Z: Let G be any distribution of womens attributes.
Then the following hold:20
1. For any n  k, total output in assortative matching under F is smaller
than total output under H:
2. For any n  k, total mens signalling under F is smaller than total mens
signalling under H:
3. For any n  k, total mens welfare under F is smaller than total mens
welfare under H if either F or H are DFR.
4. For any n  k, total womens signalling under F is smaller than total
womens signalling under H if either F or H are DFR.
5. For any n  k, total womens welfare under F is smaller than total
womens welfare under H:
6 Assortative versus random matching
We now compare the equilibrium outcome of assortative matching with sig-
nalling to the outcome where agents are matched randomly. Random matching
can also be seen as the outcome of a completely pooling equilibrium in our
signalling model.
While the matching surplus generated through assortative matching is clearly
larger than the one obtainable through random matching, assortative match-
ing involves the cost of signalling e¤orts. The main questions are: 1) Under
which conditions is the increase in total expected output achieved by assorta-
tive matching completely o¤set by the increased cost of signalling ? 2) Which
18Under H; the e¤ort of men with high types is larger, while the e¤ort of men with low
types is smaller.
19Using our terminology, Suen (2005) has only results on the e¤ects of overall increases in
mens quality on womens welfare, paralleling point 5 of the Proposition below.
20Note that points 1,2,5 also hold for increases in the rst-order (or standard) stochastic
sense.
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types prefer random matching, and which types prefer assortative matching
with signalling ?
6.1 Total welfare
Total welfare in random matching is given by:
W r(n; k) = 2min(n; k)EX  EY (8)
We obtain the following result:
Theorem 2 1. Suppose that n = k. Then random matching is welfare supe-
rior (inferior) to assortative matching based on signalling if F and G are
IFRA (DFRA).
2. For any n  k, assortative matching based on signalling is welfare superior
to random matching if F and G are DFR.
In particular, for n = k; random matching and assortative matching with
signalling are welfare-equivalent if the distributions of agentstypes are expo-
nential. The results in Section 7 will provide some more intuition for the above
result in terms of a measure of the heterogeneity in the populations.
6.2 Individual welfare
We have compared above total welfare from assortative matching with the total
welfare from random matching. We now make this comparison from each agents
point of view.
Obviously, agents with low types prefer random matching. To see this,
consider a man with a very low type x. This mans expected utility under
random matching is xEY . On the other hand, this mans expected utility
from assortative matching is approximately xEY(1;n) minus his bid, since he
is going to match almost surely with the woman with the lowest type. Since
EY > EY(1;n); such a man prefers the random matching.
Lemma 1 For any distributions F and G; and for any n  k; there exists at
most one cuto¤ type x^ 2 [0; F ] such that all men x < x^ are better-o¤ under
random matching, while all men x  x^ are better-o¤ under assortative matching
based on signalling (and analogously for women).
From Theorem 2 we know that assortative matching with signalling yields
a higher total welfare than random matching if F and G are DFR. Together
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with the above Lemma, this implies that, if F and G are DFR, there must exist
some types of agents that prefer assortative matching with signalling to random
matching, i.e., the cuto¤ points are interior.
Suppose now that F and G are not DFR, such that the cuto¤ dened in
Lemma 1 does not necessarily exist. The interesting question is now whether it
is possible that all agents, including those with high types, are better-o¤ under
random matching ? The answer is a¢ rmative, and is illustrated next:
Proposition 8 Let n = k; and assume that F < 1: If F stochastically dom-
inates the uniform distribution on [0; F ], then all types of men prefer random
matching to assortative matching based on signalling.21 Analogous results hold
for women.
7 Large populations
We now consider the continuous version where there are measures of men and
women, distributed according to F and G; respectively. Both measures are
normalized to one.22 Our analysis will focus on the connections between this
model and the discrete model analyzed so far.
Under assortative matching, a man with attribute x is matched with a
woman with attribute y =  (x) , where  (x) = G 1F (x) :Let ' =   1:
Expected output (and welfare) under randommatching is given by 2EXEY =
2(
R F
0
xf(x)dx)(
R G
0
yg(y)dy): Expected output under assortative matching is
given by 2
R F
0
x (x) f(x)dx: The signalling activity that enable assortative
matching is characterized in the next proposition:
Proposition 9 1. In the continuous model, the equilibrium signalling func-
tion for men (women) in the side-symmetric signalling equilibrium is given
by (x) =
R x
0
z 0 (z) dz ((y) =
R y
0
z'0 (z) dz) :
2. In each matched pair, exactly half the output from assortative matching is
wasted through signalling.
In the discrete case we showed that total signalling e¤ort is less than one half
output (see Proposition 2-4). Here perfect competition always drives signalling
up to precisely half the output of each matched pair.23 . The above equilibrium
21 If F is stochastically dominated by the uniform distribution, then some types of men
prefer random matching to the assortative matching with signalling.
22This is for simplicity. The generalization should be clear.
23The proof in the Appendix establishes close relations between signalling, net welfare and
stable (i.e., core) payo¤s for each matched pair. While the coe¢ cient of one-half stems from
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characterization can be used to derive analogous results to the discrete case. For
example, an immediate application yields the comparison between assortative
and random matching in the continuous version:
Theorem 3 In the continuous model, assortative matching based on signalling
is welfare superior (inferior) to random matching if
Cov(X; (X))
EX  E (X)  () 1
The above result can be more easily explained in the symmetric setting where
F = G. Let CV  pV ar (X)=EX be the coe¢ cient of variation of F = G: A
smaller CV means that types are less heterogeneous. Proposition 3 immediately
yields:
Corollary 2 Let F = G: In this symmetric continuous model, assortative
matching based on signalling is welfare superior (inferior) to random match-
ing if CV pV ar (X)=EX  () 1: In particular, assortative matching based
on signalling is welfare superior (inferior) to random matching if F is DFRA
(IFRA).
The last part of the corollary follows by Barlow and Proschans (1975) result
whereby CV  () 1 if F is DFRA (IFRA). Thus, the result of the continuous
model neatly ts, and is stronger than the one obtained for the discrete model.
Note that CV = 1 for the exponential distribution. As in the discrete case with
equal numbers of men and women, total welfare in random matching equals
total welfare in assortative matching with signalling under this distribution.
It is intuitive that the di¤erence in expected output between assortative
matching and random matching gets smaller as the heterogeneity in the popu-
lation gets smaller. By Proposition 9, total signalling e¤orts are proportional
to output for any level of heterogeneity.24 Therefore, net welfare in assortative
matching eventually falls below the welfare level in random matching as the
level of heterogeneity gets smaller.
Remark 2 We have mentioned in the introduction that our insights delivers
immediate results for other, less general models: Here are two examples: 1)
the assumption that output is shared equally by the members of each matched pair, these
type of relations are more general, and hold for any xed sharing rule.
24For example, consider a sequence of distribution functions converging to the Dirac distri-
bution on  <1: Observe that, as the distributions become more concentrated, the limiting
value of aggregate signalling is still half the limiting value of the expected output, and thus
bounded away from zero. Even when the probability that a potential matching partner is
worse than  gets arbitrarily small; agents still engage in signalling in order to prevent being
matched with a low type.
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Consider a setting where the attributes of one side of the market (say men)
are known. Then, signalling is only performed by one side, and the waste from
signalling is halved. Thus, assortative matching via signalling becomes more
attractive relative to random matching, and, by an argument similar to the one
in Corollary 2, we obtain that assortative matching is welfare superior (inferior)
to random matching if CV pV ar (X)=EX  () 1=3: In particular, the two
alternatives are now equivalent for the distribution of attributes that is uniform
on a bounded interval. 2) Consider now a model with complete information
and without any signalling. Since signalling amounted to half output in the
two-sided incomplete information model, Corollary 2 basically says that for IFR
(DFR) distributions random matching yields an output that is more than half
(less than half) the output from assortative matching. In particular, the coarse
matching analyzed by McAfee (2002) yields at least three-quarters of the output
in assortative matching for the class of distributions studied in that paper25 .
The above comparison of assortative and random matching in the continuous
model was obtained by a direct argument. But, the result was clearly related
to the one we previously obtained in the discrete version. What is the general
relation between the discrete model and the continuous model? We now show
how results in the continuous model can be obtained by considering the limit in
the discrete model as the number of agents goes to innity. We illustrate this
phenomenon by showing that per capita output, and total signalling e¤ort in the
discrete model indeed converge to their continuous counterparts. For simplicity,
we focus below on the symmetric case where n = k; and F = G: Recall that in
the discrete case where n = k and F = G; total welfare is given by :
W (n; n) = 2
nX
i=1
(n  i+ 1)  EX(i;n)   EX(i 1;n)EX(i;n) (9)
Proposition 10 Assume F = G; and n = k in the discrete model. For each n;
consider the side-symmetric signalling equilibrium yielding assortative match-
ing, and let n go to innity. Then, per capita expected output, expected total
signalling, and expected welfare in the discrete model converge to expected out-
put, expected signalling, and expected total welfare in the continuous model.
8 Conclusion
We have studied two-sided matching models where privately informed agents
on each side are matched on the basis of costly signals. For the welfare analysis
25This is a subclass of the IFR distributions.
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we have assumed that signals are wasted. Our study reveals how welfare on
both sides of the market is a¤ected by changes in primitives of the model such
as the number of the agents, and the distributions of their attributes. We have
also identied conditions under which assortative matching based on wasteful
signalling is welfare superior (inferior) to random matching. Thus, the e¤ects of
policies that attempt to curb wasteful signalling need to be carefully examined
in each particular situation26 . The analysis of markets with nite numbers of
agents on each side has been made possible by the application of results and
methods from mathematical statistics. We believe that the applications of these
methods will be fruitful also in other areas such as double auctions. Finally, we
hope that our model (or some of its many possible variations) will be useful as
a sound, theoretical basis around which to organize observations in a variety of
empirical studies, e.g., of marriage, labor and education markets.
9 Appendix A: Order statistics and sto-
chastic orders
Denition 3 For any two non-negative random variables, X and Z; with dis-
tributions F and H and hazard rates x and z; respectively, X is said to be
smaller than Z in the hazard rate order (denoted as X hr Z) if x (s)  z (s) ;
for all s  0: X is said to be smaller than Z in the usual stochastic order (de-
noted as X st Z) if F (s)  H (s) for all s  0:
Theorem 4 (see Shaked and Shanthikumar ,1994):
1. If X and Z are two random variables such that X hr Z; then X st Z:
2. Let X1; X2; :::; Xn be independent random variables. Then:
 X(i;n) hr X(i+1;n) for i = 1; 2; :::; n  1;
 X(i 1;n 1) hr X(i;n) for i = 2; 3; :::; n
 X(i;n 1) hr X(i;n) for i = 2; 3; :::; n  1:
With respect to order statistics, the basic consequence of single crossing for
random variables ordered by the star-shaped order is:
26Alternatively, this holds for policies that attempt to manipulate the rent accruing to a
third party, such as an intermediary (see Hoppe et al., 2005).
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Theorem 5 (see Barlow and Proschan, 1966) Let X;Z two random variables
with distributions F;H respectively, such that F (0) = H(0) = 0; and such that
H 1F is star-shaped. Then:
1. The function !(i; n) = EX(i;n)  EZ(i;n) changes sign at most once when
i (n) increases and then from positive to negative (negative to positive), if
at all. If EX = EZ then a change of sign when i increases must occur.
2. The ratio EX(i;n)=EZ(i;n) is decreasing (increasing) in i (n).
3. The ratio EX(n i;n)=EZ(n i;n) is decreasing in n:
Many of our proofs rely on a conjunction of the above result with the fol-
lowing Lemma:
Theorem 6 (see Barlow and Proschan, 1966): Consider i > 0; i  0;
i = 1; 2; ; n; such that i=i is increasing in i: Then (
Pn
1 aii)=(
Pn
1 i) 
(
Pn
1 aii)=(
Pn
1 i) for any a1  a2:::  an:
Two simple, but important consequences are:
Theorem 7 (see Barlow and Proschan, 1966)
1. If H 1F is star-shaped, and if EX = EZ then
nX
i=1
ai[(n i+1)(EX(i;n) EX(i 1;n))] 
nX
i=1
ai[(n i+1)(EZ(i;n) EZ(i 1;n))]
2. If F is IFRA (DFRA) then:
nX
i=1
ai[(n  i+ 1)(EX(i;n)   EX(i 1;n))]  ()EX
nX
i=1
ai
We will also use the following generalizations of Barlow and Proschans re-
sults:
Theorem 8 (see Hu and Wei, 2001) Dene U(j;i;n)  X(j;n)  X(i;n) for 0 
i < j  n: Let F be DFR (IFR). Then U(j 1;i 1;n 1) hr (hr)U(j;i;n):
Theorem 9 (see Khaledi and Kochar, 1999):
1. If X hr Z and either X or Z is DFR, then (n i+1)(X(i;n) X(i 1;n)) st
(n  i+ 1)(Z(i;n)   Z(i 1;n)); i = 1; 2; 3; :::; n:
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10 Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We rst show that the function  in (1) is strictly
monotonically increasing. Note that (1) can be written as
 (x) =
Z x
0
(
n 1X
i=n k+1
f(i;n 1) (s)

EY(k n+i+1;k)   EY(k n+i;k)
)
sds
+
Z x
0
f(n k;n 1) (s)EY(1;k)sds
Taking the derivative with respect to x yields
0 (x) =
n 1X
i=n k+1
f(i;n 1) (x)

EY(k n+i+1;k)   EY(k n+i;k)

x
+f(n k;n 1) (x)EY(1;k)x
which is strictly positive because Y(k n+i+1;k) st Y(k n+i;k) .
Next, we check whether the second-order condition is satised. Integrating
the RHS of (1) by parts, yields
 (x) = x
n 1X
i=n k+1
EY(k (n i);k)

F(i 1;n 1) (x)  F(i;n 1) (x)

+xF(n 1;n 1) (y)EY(k;k)
 
Z x
0
(
n 1X
i=n k+1
EY(k (n i);k)

F(i 1;n 1) (s)  F(i;n 1) (s)
)
ds
 
Z y
0
F(n 1;n 1) (s)EY(k;k)ds
= x
nX
i=n k+1
Fni (x)EY(k (n i);k)  
Z x
0
nX
i=n k+1
EY(k (n i);k)Fni (s) ds
Let z =  1 (b) be the type for which the equilibrium e¤ort is b: The expected
payo¤ of a man with type x from exerting e¤ort  (z) is thus given by:
U (b; x) =
nX
i=n k+1

F(i 1;n 1) (z)  F(i;n 1) (z)

xEY(k (n i);k)    (z)
=
nX
i=n k+1
Fni (z)EY(k (n i);k) (x  z)
+
Z z
0
nX
i=n k+1
EY(k (n i);k)Fni (s) ds
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Hence, the di¤erence between the expected payo¤s of type x when he exerts
e¤orts of  (x) and  (z) is:
U ( (x) ; x)  U ( (z) ; x) = Pni=n k+1 Fni (z)EY(k (n i);k) (z   x)
  R z
x
Pn
i=n k+1EY(k (n i);k)F
n
i (s) ds
(10)
Since  is strictly increasing, the functionH(s) =
Pn
i=n k+1 F
n
i (s)EY(k (n i);k)
increases in s and therefore the di¤erence in (10) is always positive.
Proof of Proposition 2. 1) Substituting (1) into (2) yields:
Sm (n; k) = n
Z F
0
Z x
0
n 1X
i=n k+1
f(i 1;n 1) (s)EY(k (n i);k)sdsf (x) dx
 n
Z F
0
Z x
0
n 1X
i=n k+1
f(i;n 1) (s)EY(k (n i);k)sdsf (x) dx
+n
Z F
0
Z x
0
f(n 1;n 1) (s)EY(k;k)sdsf (x) dx (11)
Integrating the rst plus the third terms of (11) by parts and rearranging
terms, we obtain
n
Z F
0
Z x
0
nX
i=n k+1
f(i 1;n 1) (s)EY(k (n i);k)sdsf (x) dx
= n
Z F
0
[1  F (x)]
nX
i=n k+1
xf(i 1;n 1) (x)EY(k (n i);k)dx
= n
Z F
0
nX
i=n k+1
n  i+ 1
n
xf(i 1;n) (x)EY(k (n i);k)dx
=
nX
i=n k+1
(n  i+ 1)EX(i 1;n)EY(k (n i);k)
Similarly, integrating the second term of (11) by parts, we obtain
 n
Z F
0
Z x
0
n 1X
i=n k+1
f(i;n 1) (s)EY(k (n i);k)sdsf (x) dx
=  n
Z F
0
[1  F (x)]
n 1X
i=n k+1
xf(i;n 1) (x)EY(k (n i);k)dx
=  n
Z F
0
n 1X
i=n k+1
n  i
n
xf(i;n) (x)EY(k (n i);k)dx
=
nX
i=n k+1
(n  i)EX(i;n)EY(k (n i);k)
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Collecting terms, yields:
Sm (n; k)
=
nX
i=n k+1

(n  i+ 1)EX(i 1;n)   (n  i)EX(i;n)

EY(k (n i);k) (12)
=
nX
i=n k+1
(n  i+ 1)EX(i 1;n)
 
EY(k n+i+1;k)   EY(k n+i;k)

2) Analogous to the above.
3) Follows from the denition of gross surplus and points 1, 2 above.
4) Note that the only di¤erence in the expressions for W (n; k) on the one
hand, and Sm (n; k) + Sw (n; k) on the other, is that the normalized spacings
appearing in W (n; k) are multiplied by a higher weight, corresponding to the
expectation of a higher order statistic. Thus
Sm (n; k) + Sw (n; k)  W (n; k),
W (n; k) + Sm (n; k) + Sw (n; k)  2W (n; k),
2
nX
i=n k+1
EX(i;n)EY(k (n i);k)  2W (n; k),
nX
i=n k+1
EX(i;n)EY(k (n i);k)  W (n; k) (13)
as desired.
Proof of Proposition 3. 1) For j = i   (n  k) ;we rewrite total mens
signalling as:
Sm (n; k) =
kX
j=1
(k   j + 1)  EY(j;k)   EY(j 1;k)EX(j+n k 1;n) (14)
The result follows since EY(j;k) st EY(j 1;k) and since EX(j+n k 1;n) is sto-
chastically increasing in n (see Teorem 4) :
2) For j = i  (n  k) ;we rewrite total womens signalling as:
Sw (n; k) =
kX
j=1
(k   j + 1)  EX(j+n k;n)   EX(j+n k 1;n)EY(j 1;k) (15)
Th result follows by Theorem 8.
3) Mens total welfare is given by:
Wm (n; k) =
kX
j=1
(k   j + 1)  EX(j+n k;n)   EX(j+n k 1;n)EY(j;k) (16)
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which is is similar to womens signalling (expression (15)). The proof is analo-
gous to that at point 2 above, and we omit it here.
4) Womens total welfare is given by :
Ww (n; k) =
kX
j=1
(k   j + 1)  EY(j;k)   EY(j 1;k)EX(j+n k;n) (17)
which is is similar to mens signalling (expression (14)). The proof is analogous
to that at point 1 above, and we omit it here.
Proof of Proposition 4. 1) Mens total signalling is given by (14). Thus,
Sm (n; k) =
kX
j=1
(k   j + 1)  EY(j;k)   EY(j 1;k)EX(j+n k 1;n)
=
k+1X
i=2
(k   i+ 2)  EY(i 1;k)   EY(i 2;k)EX(i+n k 2;n)
Sm (n; k + 1) =
k+1X
j=1
(k   j + 2)  EY(j;k+1)   EY(j 1;k+1)EX(j+n k 2;n)
=
k+1X
j=2
(k   j + 2)  EY(j;k+1)   EY(j 1;k+1)EX(j+n k 2;n)
+(k + 1)EY(1;k+1)EX(n k 1;n)
Dene EV(i;k)  EY(i;k)   EY(i 1;k): This yields:
Sm (n; k + 1)  Sm (n; k)
=
k+1X
j=2
(k   j + 2)  EV(j;k+1)   EV(j 1;k)EX(j+n k 2;n)
+(k + 1)EY(1;k+1)EX(n k 1;n)
Note that the rst term of the RHS is positive (negative) if G is DFR (IFR).
This follows from Theorem 8, and yields the result.
2)Womens total signalling is given by (4). The stated result follows imme-
diately from Theorem 4.
3) Mens total welfare (expression (3)) is similar to womens total signalling
(expression (4). The proof is analogous to the one for womens total signalling
at point 2 above, and we omit it here.
4)Womens total welfare (expression (5)) is similar to mens total signalling
(expression (2)). The proof is analogous to the one for mens total signalling at
point 1 above, and we omit it here.
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Proof of Proposition 5 1) Let ai =  EY(k n+i;k) for i = n; n  1; ::n  k+
1;and ai = 0 for i = n   k; n   k   1; :::; 1: Then a1  a2:::  an; and output
under F (H) is given by
Pn
i=1 aiEX(i;n) (
Pn
i=1 aiEZ(i;n)). By Theorem 5-(2),
we know that EZ(i;n)=EX(i;n) is increasing in i: By assumption, EX = EZ :
This implies
Pn
i=1EX(i;n) =
Pn
i=1EZ(i;n). Setting i = Z(i;n) and i = X(i;n)
in Theorem 6 we get
Pn
i=1 aiEZ(i;n) 
Pn
i=1 aiEX(i;n) . Since for all i; ai  0,
the wished result follows.
2) Mens total signalling is given by (2). Consider rst the case n = k. Set
i = EZ(i;n) and i = EX(i;n); i = 1; 2; ::n; and ai = (n i)(EY(i+1;n) EY(i;n));
i = 1; 2; ::n  1; and an = 0: If the distribution of women is IFR, we obtain that
a1  a2::  an; and the result follows from Theorem 7-(1).
3) Womens total signalling (expression (2)) is similar to mens total welfare
(expression (3)) . The proof is analogous to the one for mens welfare at point
4 below, and we omit it here.
4) Mens total welfare is given in (3). The result follows directly from
Theorem 7-(1) by setting ai as in point 1 above.
5)Womens total welfare is given in (5). Assume rst that n  k: Set i and
i as in point 1 above, and set ai =  (n  i+ 1)(EY(k n+i;k)   EY(k n+i 1;k)
If G is DFR, then a1  a2:::  an; and the result follows from Theorem 6.
Let n = k: Set i and i as in point 1 above, and set ai = (n i+1)(EY(i;n) 
EY(i 1;n)) , i = 1; 2; ::n: If G is IFR, then a1  a2:::  an; and the result follows
from Theorem 6.
Proof of Proposition 6. 1) Using (2) and (4), we get:
Sm (n; n) Sw (n; n) =
nX
i=1
(n  i+ 1) (EY(i;n)EX(i 1;n) EY(i 1;n)EX(i;n))  0
The last inequality follows from Theorem 5-(2) which says that the ratio EX(i;n)=EY(i;n)
is decreasing in i .
2) From Proposition 3 we know that:
(i) for any n  k; and any F;G; Sm (n; k)  Sm (k; k) ;
(ii) for any n  k; for any G; and for F IFR, Sw (n; k)  Sw (k; k)
Since G 1F convex implies G 1F star-shaped, the result follows directly
from 1) and (i), (ii) if F is IFR.
Assume now that G is IFR. This means that H 1G convex, where H is the
exponential distribution. Thus, H1GG 1F = H 1F is convex (since it is a
composition of increasing convex functions), which means that F is IFR. The
result follows as above.
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Proof of Proposition 7: Points 1, 2 , 5 follow immediately by inspection of
the relevant expressions in Proposition2. Points 3,4 follow by these expressions
and Theorem 9 in Appendix A.
Proof of Theorem 2 1) Welfare in random matching can be written as:
W r(n; n) = 2nEX  EY = nEX
Pn
i=1EY(i;n)
n
+ nEY
Pn
i=1EX(i;n)
n
(18)
= EX
nX
i=1
EY(i;n) + EY
nX
i=1
EX(i;n) (19)
Welfare in assortative matching is given by (6). Let ai =  EY(i;n), and note
that ai is decreasing in i: 27 Applying Theorem 7-(2) yields: if F is IFRA
(DFRA), then
 
nX
i=1
EY(i;n)[(n  i+ 1)
 
EX(i;n)   EX(i 1;n)

]  ()  EX
nX
i=1
EY(i;n) (20)
Multiplying by ( 1); we obtain: if F is IFRA (DFRA), then
nX
i=1
EY(i;n)[(n  i+ 1)
 
EX(i;n)   EX(i 1;n)

]  ()EX
nX
i=1
EY(i;n) (21)
Similarly, we obtain: if G is IFRA (DFRA), then
nX
i=1
EX(i;n)[(n  i+ 1)
 
EY(i;n)   EY(i 1;n)

]  ()EX
nX
i=1
EX(i;n) (22)
The combination of (21) and (22) completes the proof.
2) The result for the general case n  k follows by applying the entry results
of Proposition 3: Recall that, by Proposition 3, entry by men increases welfare
in assortative matching based on signalling if F is DFR (and hence DFRA).
The result follows by noting that entry on the long side does not a¤ect welfare
from random matching since the number of matched pairs remains constant.
Proof of Lemma 1 Let Ua (x) ; Ur (x) denote the expected utility of type
x under assortative matching with signalling, and under random matching, re-
spectively.
Note that Ua (x) = maxs
Pn
i=n k+1 F
n
i (s)xEY(k n+i;k)    (s)
	
is an in-
creasing convex function (since it is the maximum of linear increasing functions),
27Please note that Barlow and Proschan (1966) contains a crucial typo here, and they mix
(only at their point (iii) ) IFRA and DFRA.
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while Ur is an increasing linear function with slope EY: Thus, these functions
can cross at most once. Note further that the derivative of Ua (x) at x = 0 is
dUa (x)
dx

x=0
=
nX
i=n k+1
Fni (0)EY(k n+i;k)  EY(1;k) < EY
where the rst inequality follows either by
Pn
i=n k+1 F
n
i (0)EY(k n+i;k) = 0 if
n > k; (since Fni (0) = 0 if i > 1) or by
Pn
i=n k+1 F
n
i (0)EY(k n+i;k)  EY(1;n)
for n = k; (since Fn1 (0) = lim"!0 F (")
"  1): Thus, Ua (x)  Ur (x) in a
neighborhood of zero, and the wished result follows.
Proof of Proposition 8 By Lemma 1, it is clear that if the man with the
highest type prefers random matching, then all other types of men prefer random
matching as well ( and analogously for women). Under assortative matching
based on signalling, the expected utility of the type  man is
Ua() = EY(n;n)  
n 1X
i=1
EX(i;n 1)
 
EY(i+1;n)   EY(i;n)

The expected utility of this type under random matching is
Ur() =   EY = 
n
(
nX
i=1
EY(i;n))
If F stochastically dominates (is stochastically dominated by) the uniform dis-
tribution, we obtain that EX(i;n 1)  () in : Then
Ua()  () EY(n;n)   
n
n 1X
i=1
i
 
EY(i+1;n)   EY(i;n)

=

n
(
nX
i=1
EY(i;n)) = U
r()
Proof of Proposition 9 1) Consider mens types x; x^; x > x^; with equilib-
rium bids (x); (x^): In equilibrium, type x is assortatively matched with type
 (x), and x^ is matched with  (x^) : Type x should not pretend that he is x^
(thus being matched with  (x^) and paying (x^)), and vice-versa for type x^.
This yields:
x (x)  (x)  x (x^)  (x^)
x^ (x^)  (x^)  x^ (x)  (x)
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Combining the above and dividing by x  x^; gives:
x^ (x)  x^ (x^)
x  x^ 
(x)  (x^)
x  x^ 
x (x)  x (x^)
x  x^
Taking the limit x^ ! x gives 0(x) = x 0 (x) : Together with (0) = 0;
this yields (x) =
R x
0
z 0 (z) dz . Letting ' =   1; we analogously obtain
(y) =
R y
0
z'0 (z) dz.
2) It is well known that the unique stable (i.e., core) payo¤ conguration
for our two-sided market with a continuum of agents (and with complete infor-
mation) is given by:
w(x) = 2
Z x
0
 (t)dt; v(y) = 2
Z y
0
'(t)dt
By part 1, we know that
(x) =
Z x
0
t 0(t)dt = x (x) 
Z x
0
 (t)dt
and similarly for women. The above equations yield:
x (x) = (x) +
1
2
w(x) = ( (x)) +
1
2
v( (x))
Since in the core there are no transfers outside matched pairs, it must hold
that
8x; w(x) + v( (x)) = 2x (x)
This yields:
(x) + ( (x)) = 2x (x)  1
2
[w(x) + v( (x)] = x (x)
as claimed
Proof of Theorem 3 By Proposition 9, total welfare in assortative match-
ing based on signalling is
R 
0
x (x) f(x)dx: Thus, assortative matching with
signalling is welfare superior (inferior) to random matching if:Z 
0
x (x) f(x)dx  [] 2
Z 
0
xf (x) dx
Z 
0
yg(y)dy ,
E(X (X))  [] 2EX  EY ,
E(X (X))  [] 2EX  E (X),
Cov(X (X))
EX  E (X)  [] 1
(Note that EY = E (X) ; the proof uses the well-known fact that for any
random variable Z with cumulative distribution H, EZ =
R 1
0
H 1 (z) dz.)
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Proof of Proposition 10. 1) Consider rst total output. In the discrete
model, it is given by:
2
nX
i=1
[
 
EX(i;n))
2
= 2(
nX
i=1
EX2(i;n)) 
nX
i=1
V ar
 
X(i;n)

)
= 2(E
 
nX
i=1
X2(i;n)
!
 
nX
i=1
V ar
 
X(i;n)

)
= 2(E
 
nX
i=1
X2i
!
 
nX
i=1
V ar
 
X(i;n)

)
= 2(nEX2  
nX
i=1
V ar
 
X(i;n)

)
where the second equality follows from the independence of attributes, the third
is a rearrangement of summands, and last one follows by the well-known Walds
Identity (see David and Nagaraja, 2003). Thus, for per capita output, we obtain:
lim
n!1
2
n
nX
i=1
[
 
EX(i;n)
2
= 2EX2   lim
n!1
2
n
nX
i=1
V ar
 
X(i;n)

= 2EX2 = 2
Z F
0
x2f(x)dx
The second to last equality follows since limn!1 2n
Pn
i=1 V ar
 
X(i;n)

= 0 ,
which follows, for example, by David and Johnsons approximation (see Arnold
and Balakrishnan, 1989):
V ar
 
X(i;n)
 ' i(n+1 i)(n+1)2 [dF 1( in+1 )]2
n+ 2
+
c2
(n+ 2)2
+
c3
(n+ 2)3
:::
where ci are uniformly bounded constants.
2) For the other parts it is enough to show that per capita welfare in the
discrete model (output less bids) converges to
R F
0
x2f(x)dx: Net per capita
welfare is given by:
W a =
2
n
nX
i=1
(n  i+ 1)EX(i;n)(EX(i;n)   EX(i 1;n))
=
2(n+ 1)
n
nX
1
(1  i
n+ 1
)EX(i;n)(EX(i;n)   EX(i 1;n))
It is well-known that, for large n, EX(i;n) is approximated by F 1( in+1 )
(see David and Nagaraja, 2003). Thus, we obtain:
W a ' 2(n+ 1)
n
nX
1
(1  i
n+ 1
)(F 1(
i
n+ 1
)[F 1(
i
n+ 1
)  F 1( i  1
n+ 1
)]
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Without the term 2(n+1)n ; the RHS is precisely a Riemann-Stieltjes sum of
the type d[(1   x)F 1(x) ; F 1(x)] where d is the partition of [0; 1] given
by 1n+1 ;
2
n+1 ; :::
n
n+1 : Since F is strictly increasing, F and F
 1 have bounded
variation. Thus, we obtain:
lim
n!1f
2(n+ 1)
n
nX
1
(1  i
n+ 1
)(F 1(
i
n+ 1
)[F 1(
i
n+ 1
)  F 1( i  1
n+ 1
)]g
=
Z 1
0
(1  x)F 1(x)dF 1(x)
= 2
Z F
0
((1  F (u))udu
where the last line follows by the change of variable x = F (u):
Finally we have :
2
Z F
0
(1  F (u)udu = 2[
Z F
0
udu 
Z F
0
F (u)udu]
= 2f
2
2
  [u
2
2
F (u) jF0  
Z F
0
u2
2
f(u)du]g
= 2[
2
2
  
2
2
+
1
2
Z F
0
u2f(u)du]
=
Z F
0
u2f(u)du
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